Thursday, January 24, 2013
Hannibal 2 (Jan 24 - Feb 5)
Nam ut omittam Philippum, quem absens hostem reddidit
Romanis, omnium his temporibus potentissimus rex Antiochus fuit. Hunc tanta
cupiditate incendit bellandi, ut usque a rubro mari arma conatus sit inferre
Italiae.
So that I might disregard (or: To say nothing of) Philip whom even though away he (i.e. Hannibal) rendered an
enemy to the Romans, king Antiochus was the most powerful of all at that time. He (i.e. Hannibal) inflamed him with so great a desire of waging war that he (i.e. Antiochus) endeavored to bring
weapons to Italy even from the red sea.
Ad quem cum legati venissent Romani, qui de eius
voluntate explorarent darentque operam, consiliis clandestinis ut Hannibalem in
suspicionem regi adducerent, tamquam ab ipsis corruptus alia atque antea
sentiret,
When the Roman envoys had come to him so
that they investigate about his intentions and try to bring Hannibal to the
suspicion of the king with their secret plans, as if having been bribed by them
he (i.e. Antiochus) would change his mind (or: he would think things other than before)
At the same time he led me to the altar at which he had started to
sacrifice, and, with the rest of the people having been set aside, he ordered
me, holding it, to swear that I will never be friends with the Romans.
neque id frustra fecissent idque Hannibal comperisset
seque ab interioribus consiliis segregari vidisset, tempore dato adiit ad
regem, eique cum multa de fide sua et odio in Romanos commemorasset, hoc
adiunxit:
and (when) they had not done that in vain and
Hannibal had discovered it and he had seen himself being excluded from the
inner council, when an opportunity appeared he went to the king
‘Pater meus’ inquit ‘Hamilcar puerulo me, utpote non
amplius IX annos nato in Hispaniam imperator proficiscens Carthagine, Iovi
optimo maximo hostias immolavit.
‘My father’ he said ‘Hamilcar when I was a
boy, that is not more that 9 years old, advancing from Carthage to Spain as a
general, he sacrificed victims to Jupiter Optimus Maximus.
Quae divina res dum conficiebatur, quaesivit a me,
vellemne secum in castra proficisci. Id cum libenter accepissem atque ab eo
petere coepissem, ne dubitare ducere, tum ille ‘Faciam’, inquit ‘si mihi fidem,
quam postulo, dederis.’
While this sacrifice was being performed, he
asked me if I was willing to set out with him into the camp. When I had
willingly accepted that and I had begun to ask (him) not to hesitate to lead
(me), then he said ‘I ‘ll do this, if you give me the promise that I ask.’
Simul me ad aram adduxit, apud quam sacrificare
instituerat, eamque ceteris remotis tenentem iurare iussit numquam me in
amicitiam cum Romanis fore.
Id ego ius iurandum patri datum usque ad hanc aetatem ita conservavi, ut nemini
dubium esse debeat, quin reliquo tempore eadem mente sim futurus.
I thus kept this oath that I gave to my
father continuously to this age that no one ought to doubt that I shall be of
the same mind for the rest of my life.
Quare, si quid amice de Romanis cogitabis, non
imprudenter feceris, si me celaris; cum quidem bellum parabis, te ipsum
frustraberis, si non me in eo principem posueris.’
Therefore, if you (will) think something
about the Romans in a friendly way, you will not act without imprudence if
you (will) hide this from me. When you
‘ll prepare (for) war, you will disappoint you yourself, if you will not make
me the leader in this (war).’
Hac igitur, qua diximus, aetate cum patre in Hispaniam
profectus est.
At this age therefore which we have said he
set forth with his father to Spain.
Friday, January 18, 2013
Life of Hannibal 1 (Jan 18 - Jan 24)
Hannibal, Hamilcaris filius, Carthageniensis. Si verum
est, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit, non
est infitiandum Hannibalem tanto praestitisse ceteros imperatores prudentia,
quanto populus Romanus antecedat fortitudine cunctas nationes.
Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, a
Carthaginian. If it is true, which no
one doubts, that the Roman people surpassed all (other) peoples in virtue, it
is not to be denied that Hannibal surpassed other generals in prudence as much
as the Roman people surpass all nations (gathered together) in strength.
Nam quotienscumque cum eo congressus est in Italia,
semper discessit superior. Quod nisi domi civium suorum invidia debilitatus
esset, Romanos videtur superare potuisse. Sed multorum obtectratio devicit
unius virtutem.
For as often as he engaged them (i.e. the
Roman people) in Italy, he always came off with the advantage. And had not his
efforts be paralyzed by the envy of his countrymen at home, he appeared to have
been capable of getting the mastery over the Romans. But the jealous opposition
of many prevailed against the ability of one.
Hic autem velut hereditate relictum odium paternum erga Romanos sic conservavit ut prius animam quam id deposuerit, qui quidem cum patria pulsus esset et alienarum opum indigeret, numquam destiterit animo bellare cum Romanis.
Hic autem velut hereditate relictum odium paternum erga Romanos sic conservavit ut prius animam quam id deposuerit, qui quidem cum patria pulsus esset et alienarum opum indigeret, numquam destiterit animo bellare cum Romanis.
However he thus preserved his paternal
hatred against the Romans which was left as if by inheritance that he laid down
his spirit before it, who even when he was exiled from his country and he was
in need of foreign help, he never stopped waging war against the Romans with his
soul.
Cornelius Nepos & Hannibal
Hi everyone,
I decided to post the entries from Brill's New Pauly (a classics encyclopedia) about Nepos and Hannibal so that you can get an idea.
[4] Carthaginian general, end 3rd cent. BC
I decided to post the entries from Brill's New Pauly (a classics encyclopedia) about Nepos and Hannibal so that you can get an idea.
[2] Cornelius N. Biographer and historian, 1st cent. BC
(c. 100-24 BC) represents the dynamic of intellectual
culture in Rome during the 1st cent. BC. He hailed from theTranspadana region and was an equestrian. N. was a friend of Cicero (Gell. 15,28,1; they exchanged letters which have
since been lost: Suet. Iul. 55,1) as well as of T. Pomponius Atticus. Catullus dedicated a libellus to him (Catull.
1,1,3-7). N. apparently had no opportunity to be active in political life, and
became prominent only through his literary works. These included erotic poems
that are now lost (Plin. Epist. 5,3,1). In addition N. was the author of the
3-volumeChronica, of which only fragments remain, in which he expanded
the Chroniká of Apollodorus [7] of Athens (2nd cent. BC) and brought them into his own
time. Like Apollodurus, N. dealt with political events as well as events in
literary history, and he was apparently a model for Latin chroniclers up to Hieronymus. Both works
were written before 54 BC. After 44 BC he wrote the 5-volume Exempla (Gell. 6,18,11),
a collection of Greco-Roman anecdotes. N.'s primary work, De viris
illustribus (‘famous men), which consisted of at least 16 volumes, presaged the concept
of Greco-Roman cultural unity that characterized the Augustan period; portions
of these volumes still exist; they represent the first ancient collection of
biographies known today [1].
N. linked the Hellenistic tradition of writings Περὶ ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν (Perì endóxōn andrôn, ‘on famous
men) - Varro'sImagines, among others, was a model that was available to
N. - with political biography. In so doing, he continued a practice that had
already been used in the Chronicle, which was to
link the depiction of cultural and political achievements: this documents the
changing intellectual climate in Rome. He appears always to have sought a
comparison between Greece and Rome, and for each volume on Roman personages
there was one on their Greek counterparts. The volume De excellentibus
ducibus exterarum gentium on ‘outstanding commanders from foreign nations has
been preserved, containing biographies of 20 Greek army commanders as well as
of the Carian Datames(14) and the
Carthaginians Hamilcar [3] (22) and Hannibal [4] (23). The chapter De regibus on ‘kings (21)
may be the product of later editorial efforts. Descriptions of the lives of
Cato [1] Censorius and T. Pomponius Atticus (cf. [2]), which have also been preserved, are
probably from his volume on historians. In addition, important fragments such
as the so-called Cornelia fragment (an excerpt from a letter by Cornelia
[I 1] to C. Sempronius Gracchus) are still in existence.
[4] Carthaginian general, end 3rd cent. BC
Son
of Hamilcar [3]
Barkas, the Barcid, 247/46-183 BC. Most famous Carthaginian, brilliant
commander, and lifelong enemy of Rome, after whom the 2nd Punic War was called
H.'s War. In 237, while accompanying his father to Iberia, H. is said to have
sworn relentless hatred of Rome (Liv. 35,19; App. Hisp. 9,34). Until 224, H.
appears to have lived at times in Spain, at times in Carthage. After that, he
became a subcommander of his brother-in-law Hasdrubal [2] (Liv. 21,3,2-4,2), and following the latter's death
(221), the troops proclaimed H. the succeeding strategos for Libya and Iberia, the appointment
also being confirmed in Carthage (Pol. 3,13,3f.; Liv. 21,3,1; Diod. Sic. 25,15;
App. Hisp. 8,29). After conducting successful campaigns against Celtiberian
tribes ( Carpetani, Olcades, Vaccaei), H. aimed at breaking the resistance of Saguntum, an
effort that a Roman representation tried to prevent in Carthago Nova in 220/19
and subsequently in Carthage (Pol. 3,13-15; Liv. 21,5-6; 9,3). The Carthaginian
Senate rejected the Romans, granting H. free rein (App. Hisp. 10,37). The
conflict surrounding the capture of the city, which H. achieved after a siege
of eight months (Pol. 3,17), gave rise to the 2nd Punic War (218-201 BC): the
Romans had unsuccessfully demanded H.'s extradition in Carthage ─ H. having
captured the area north of the Ebro in the spring of 218 ─ and declared war. H.
then thwarted the Roman strategic plans by swiftly and boldly advancing across
the Pyrenees and the Alps into Upper Italy, where he arrived in October. The crossing
of the Alps with 38,000 troops, 8,000 cavalrymen, and elephants incurred heavy
losses and is much discussed in its topographical details. H.'s triumphal
march, marked by the Roman defeats of P. Cornelius [I 68]
Scipio on the Ticinus and Ti.
Sempronius Longus on the Trebia (218), then of C. Flaminius [1] on Lake Trasimene (217) and L. Aemilius [I 31]
Paullus at Cannae (216) did,
however, end up in inglorious positional warfare in Southern Italy because the
Romans refused to engage in negotiations and H. refused to besiege Rome. H.,
who had hoped to dismantle the Roman confederation system with his call for
freedom, managed in 216-213 to win over cities such as Capua, Locri, Tarentium,
even entering alliances with the Macedon King Philippus Vand with Syracuse (Stv 3,524; 525; 527-529; 531), but
in the end he failed to succeed. Beginning with the recapture of Syracuse,
Capua, etc. (212-209), the victory over Hasdrubal [3] (207), and the successes of P. Cornelius [I 71]
Scipioin Spain (209-206),
the Romans clearly were gaining the upper hand. Although H. returned undefeated
to North Africa in 203 in order ─ now as omnipotentiary strategos ─ to fight against the Roman invasion
led by Scipio, whose invading troops had been successful since 204 and were
allied with Massinissa, H.'s defeat at Zama (autumn 202) resulted in the
capitulation of Carthage (Stv 3,548).
H.,
recalled from his supreme command due to Roman pressure in 200/199, did not
emerge again until 196. As elected suffete, he cut back the membership of the
court of justice of the one hundred and four with a constitutional reform and
stabilized state revenues through strict enforcement of taxation (Liv.
33,45,6-47,3). Following this, his political enemies instigated the Romans to
intervene in Carthage's interior affairs by raising suspicions that H. was part
of an anti-Roman conspiracy along with Antiochus [5]
III the Great. H.,
outlawed in Carthage and with his house destroyed (Liv. 33,47-49; Nep. Hann. 7;
Iust. 31,1-2), evaded a Roman investigative delegation in 195 by fleeing to the
Seleucid kingdom. H. gained access to the royal council in Ephesus as a
competent informant against the Romans on the eve of the war, but was not
regarded as a serious advisor and was left to operate without much luck as
commander over a small fleet in the southern Aegean (Liv. 37,23-24; App. Syr.
22,108-109; Iust. 31,6,7-10). Because the Romans demanded H.'s extradition in
189/88 from defeated Antioch, the exiled Carthaginian fled via Crete and
Armenia ─ where he is claimed to have organized the founding of Artaxata ─ to
Bithynia (Nep. Hann. 9-10; Plut. Lucullus 31,4-5; Iust. 32,4-5). There, H.
served king Prusias I as admiral in the war against Eumenes [3] II (186-183) of Pergamum, a friend of the Romans, and
assisted in the founding of Prusa (Plin. HN 5,148). At the end of the war, when
a Roman delegation under Ti. Quinctius
Flamininus demanded H.'s
extradition from Prusias, H. poisoned himself in Libyssa(Pol. 23,5,1; App. Syr. 11,43; Plut. Flamininus 20;
Liv. 39,51; Nep. Hann. 12). In AD 200, Septimius Severus, Roman emperor from
North Africa, ordered the building of a monumental tomb for H. near the place
of the latter's death in Bithynia (Hdn. 4,8,5). In more recent times, Ataturk
ordered the construction of a memorial for H. above the coast near Gebze.
H.'spersonality
and military/political achievements were already described by the
historiographers Silenus and Sosylus who had accompanied H.'s army. These works, although
no longer extant, were the sources for later authors (e.g. Polybius, Livy,
Nepos). The ancient image of H. either as brilliant commander reminiscent of
Alexander the Great or an incarnation of a Carthage forever hostile to Rome has
become more differentiated in recent times. Regardless of the continuing
discussions whether H. failed as a statesman in situations when he should have
gained politically from his victories, or whether H. was not primarily a loyal
representative of Carthage, but rather an independent political agent following
the Hellenistic model, H.'s historical importance lies in the fact that he
brought to light to his contemporaries and to later generations the
relentlessness of Rome's politics of alliances and expansion, which proved
fatal to its enemies.
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